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This audience seems to be composed mainly of economists and
demographers. I am reminded of a story about an economist who did not
like teaching very much. He had a hobby of hot air ballooning, and one
day he took his hot air balloon out and went up into the sky with ten of
his students. It quickly became cloudy. They were pushed far away from
their home and were up in the clouds for several hours. When the clouds
at last opened up, they came down and saw a man walking by with some
young people. The economist yelled to this man, “Where are we?”
The man looked up and said, “You are ﬁfteen yards up in the sky.”
The economist looked at his students and said, “That man is a
demographer.” The students wanted to know how he knew this. “Well,”
he said, “when he answered my question, he was very precise but not
very helpful.”
The person on the ground, the demographer, looked at his students
and said, “That man is an economist.” His students asked how he knew.
“He is lost, and his head is up in the clouds,” the man on the ground
replied.
As you know, I am a demographer. I consider myself fortunate in
this regard because it is an exciting time to be a demographer. The last
century, the twentieth century, has been the most revolutionary, the most
unparalleled in human history, in terms of demographic events, and it is
likely to retain that distinction into the future.
DEMOGRAPHIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
Let me cite for you some of the demographic gold medals achieved
by the twentieth century. First, in the twentieth century, the world
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we ended at 6.1 billion. As I tell some of my students, it is easy to
remember—just reverse the numbers, 1.6, 6.1. Second, the twentieth
century recorded the highest year-over-year population growth rate ever,
2 percent. Currently, growth is about 1.2 percent per year worldwide, and
we are not going back to 2 percent. Most demographers see such record
growth as over. Third, in the late 1980s, we experienced the highest
annual global population increase ever, about 86 million. Now, growth is
about 77 million per year. Fourth, the twentieth century saw the shortest
time ever to double the world’s population, from 3 billion in 1960 to 6
billion in 1999. We also saw the shortest time to add a billion people,
twelve years. We will probably never do that again. Fifth, we had
revolutionary improvements in mortality and longevity. In my view, the
declines in mortality and increases in longevity constitute humanity’s
greatest single achievement.
Sixth, we have had unprecedented declines in fertility and family
size. The declines in fertility in the last thirty to forty years have been
remarkable. When I was studying at Michigan, Ron Friedman saw the
ﬁrst numbers for China, and we asked him, could it be possible that
fertility could drop that fast in China, by nearly a billion people, by edict?
He said he wanted to see more numbers. After he saw the numbers for a
few more years, he said he believed it—absolutely remarkable. We have
seen the same thing in Iran since the Islamic Revolution. We are seeing it
in Catholic Brazil. We are seeing it virtually everywhere—extremely
rapid declines in fertility, declines in family size, and rapid increases in
contraceptive use.
Seventh, we have seen signiﬁcant international migrations in the
twentieth century, often large. Even when the migration has been
relatively small, it has often been extremely signiﬁcant politically, and
undocumented migrants have been a major concern for many countries,
especially in Europe.
Finally, the twentieth century has seen a very rapid increase in
urbanization and the growth of mega-cities.
WHERE WE ARE GOING
Now, I have only a few minutes to speak to you this morning, and
you may be wondering what my main message is. Perhaps it can best be
illustrated by another story, this one about an immigrant, actually a
refugee, the brilliant and famous scientist Albert Einstein. As many of
you know, Einstein worked at the Institute for Advanced Studies at
Princeton University. One day, he was taken to the train station by his
colleague, Professor von Neumann, who helped him on the train. After
ﬁfteen minutes on the train, the conductor came into the car and asked for
tickets. Professor Einstein instinctively reached into his pockets looking
for his ticket. He couldn’t ﬁnd it. He got up, took his overcoat from the
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concerned as the conductor began moving down the aisle toward him. He
took out his suitcase and opened it up, looking for that damned ticket. He
took out his socks, his ties, his shirts, and his underwear, placing them all
over the corridor, blocking everything. By this time, the commotion was
noticeable.
The conductor looked down the car and recognized the silhouette of
the famous scientist. He quickly walked up to him and said in a very
comforting voice, “Professor Einstein, please don’t worry about the cost
of your ticket. I am sure that Princeton University can cover the cost.”
In reply, Einstein looked up and said, “My dear mister conductor, I
am not so much concerned about the cost of the train ticket. My main
concern is trying to ﬁgure out where I am supposed to be going.”
I will come back to this. All of us on this planet Earth are on a trip
together. The challenge facing us is that not only must we keep track of
where we started and the signiﬁcant milestones and achievements along
the way, but also, and most important, we need to understand as much
as possible where we are supposed to be going. I will try to indicate today
a bit about where we are going.
In the United Nations Population Division, one of our major activi-
ties is producing the publication World Population Prospects, published
every other year. For every country and area of the world, from 1950 to
2050 in ﬁve-year intervals, we produce for ﬁve-year age groups as many
demographic statistics as most of you can possibly consume. There are
something like 5 million separate statistics on these countries and areas.
Highlights of the 2000 Revision are available on our web site. Two
volumes of data will be published near the end of the month, and an
analytic report will follow later.
A second report that we have issued is Replacement Migration: Is It a
Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations? For the journalists present
today, the answer to this question is yes and no. This report was issued
last year, and it has been the most contentious report in our ﬁfty-ﬁve-year
history at the United Nations. It has generated more news articles, more
complaints, more discussion, and more interest than any other single
report since 1946. I think we hit a nerve in Europe, maybe even the entire
nervous system of Europe, with this report. We do not recommend that
migrants go to Europe. Nevertheless, among the hate mail and criticisms
I received was a communication from someone in France suggesting that
I, as Director of the Population Division, was advocating the replacement
of a Christian European population with a non-Christian, non-European
population—clearly a misinterpretation.
MIGRATION
Now can migration inﬂuence population? Of course it can. Can it be
a solution to aging? No. Let me give you Korea as an example. If you
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about 47 million today, you need immigration of about 100,000 per year.
Demographically, that is not much for Korea. If you want to keep the
labor force of Korea the same, you need to double this immigration to
about 213,000 per year. But what if you want to keep constant the ratio of
the working-age population to the population above age 65? For Korea
today, this ratio is 12.6, not 5 or 4 as in the developed countries. In order
to keep this ratio at 12.6, Korea would need an average of 94 million
immigrants every year for the next ﬁfty years. By 2050, the total
population of Korea would be 6.2 billion people! Clearly, this is not
possible. That is why we said migration as a solution to aging is not
realistic.
As the title of this conference indicates, the seismic demographic
developments currently under way will have profound economic conse-
quences for the world. Rapid rates of population growth in some regions,
declines in others, aging, international migration, urbanization, HIV/
AIDS, epidemics, and other demographic trends are ushering in what I
have referred to as the New International Population Order. This new
order is profoundly inﬂuencing not only economies but also social and
cultural circumstances and conditions, political inﬂuence and represen-
tation, international relations among countries and regions, and interac-
tions among various groups within countries and states and cities. This
morning I will highlight ﬁve areas in particular: size and growth,
distribution, migration, urbanization, and aging.
CURRENT DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS
An important aspect of the new order is population growth. In
today’s world of 6.1 billion people, six countries—India, China, Pakistan,
Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Indonesia—account for half of the world’s
current population growth of 77 million per year. Moreover, the popu-
lation growth of India alone in one year is equivalent to the population
growth of China, Pakistan, and Nigeria combined. For another view,
consider the comparison between the European Union and India. India
has approximately a billion people—about two and one-half times the
population of the ﬁfteen-country European Union. For the entire year
2000, the natural population increase of the European Union was 343,000
people. India achieved this growth in the ﬁrst six days of the year.
Because of low fertility rates and limits on migration, the populations
of Japan and virtually all of the European countries are growing very
little if at all. By mid century, the populations of thirty-nine countries are
actually expected to be smaller than they are today. Italy is even projected
to be smaller in 2050 than it was in 1950. Some have referred to Italy as
Europe’s future theme park, where people will visit and see the sights
and then go back home, a sort of Disney World on a country scale. Other
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to be 14 percent smaller, Slovenia and Hungary, which are projected to be
25 percent smaller, and Russia, Georgia, and Ukraine, which may be 28 to
40 percent smaller than they are today.
The United States is a notable contrast to Japan and Europe. It is
likely to be much bigger, some 40 percent bigger, depending on the
estimates, by 2050. Canada is also expected to have a larger population in
2050, about a third larger, as is Australia, with about 38 percent more
people. The populations of less developed countries are also expected to
continue to increase, despite the rapid declines in fertility that some have
experienced. In the past ﬁfty years, Africa’s population more than
tripled—from around 220 million to around 800 million. In the coming
decades, even with AIDS, we expect that the population of Africa will
double, reaching some 2 billion by 2050. To take one speciﬁc case, in 1950,
Kenya’s population was 6 million. Today, it is about 30 million, and in
2050, we expect it to be somewhere around 55 million.
The AIDS crisis is a terrible situation, and it is going from bad to
worse. Every two years, we see ever higher rates of infection. An article
in today’s New York Times talks about AIDS being on the march in Eastern
Europe. In Ukraine in 1995, 300 cases of HIV were reported. Today, there
are 38,632. Clearly, the dimensions of the AIDS crisis are still expanding.
Yet our projections still show populations continuing to grow. Even the
AIDS crisis has not changed the direction of our population projections.
The redistribution of the world’s population is and will be signiﬁ-
cant. In 1950, the ratio of the developing world’s population to the
developed world’s was about two to one. Today, it is about four to one,
and in 2050 it is likely to be seven to one. Consider also the example of
Spain and Morocco. In 1950, Spain’s population was three times larger
than Morocco’s. Fifty years from now, Morocco’s population is going to
be 60 percent greater than Spain’s. Consider the Russian Federation and
Pakistan. In 1950, the Russian Federation was approximately three times
larger than Pakistan. In ﬁfty years, Pakistan’s population will be three
times larger than the Russian Federation’s. As a ﬁnal example, compare
Israel and the Palestinian population in Occupied Palestinian Territory.
Today, the population of Israel is nearly twice the size of the Palestinian
population in Occupied Palestinian Territory. By 2050, the Palestinian
population in Occupied Palestinian Territory is projected to be 17 percent
larger than Israel’s population.
Migration trends are immensely important. At issue are not only the
migration numbers, which in some cases are quite large, but also their
political signiﬁcance and the enormous social difﬁculties that confront
some countries in dealing with immigration ﬂows. We heard earlier some
optimism about the European response. However, I should tell you that
every time migration is an agenda item at the United Nations, it is pushed
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developed, are not yet ready to deal with it at the global level.
Urbanization is another important development. It has changed the
lives of so many people, and continues to do so, that we see a completely
different world now and in the future than we had not long ago.
Thirty-ﬁve years ago, for example, approximately two-thirds of the
world’s population lived in rural areas. We project that thirty-ﬁve years
from now, two-thirds will be living in urban areas.
Population aging is going to be pervasive. In many countries, we are
going to see one out of three people over age 65. As a result of population
aging, we are going to see changes in production, consumption, market-
ing, and so on. Many of you are familiar with the chain store Toys’R’Us.
Soon, there will probably be a chain called Old’R’Us, working with the
elderly and marketing to this age group. A very important consideration
is the sex ratio among the elderly. Increasingly, this ratio is in favor of
women. Among those aged 60 years and older, there are 1.2 women for
every man. At age 80 and over, there are nearly two women for every
man, and for those above 100, usually four women for every male. This,
I think, is a very big incentive for us men to live as long as we can. The
ratio improves tremendously.
This imbalance in the sex ratio often leads to unusual behavior. For
example, there is the story of the widow who was at a retirement center
in Miami Beach. She saw a new man coming into the lobby and said to
him, “Excuse me, have you been at the center before?”
The older man looked at her and said, “No, I was just let out of
prison for murdering my wife some thirty years ago.”
She looked at him and said, “So I can take it that you are single?”
The imbalance in the sex ratio at older ages is common knowledge
and has been widely discussed. Another sex ratio that is increasingly
important is at the other end of the life spectrum, at birth. Normally,
about 105 males are born for every 100 females. However, with sono-
grams and other new technologies, couples can learn the sex of the fetus.
In some populations where one gender is preferred over another, this
could have a dramatic impact on the sex ratio. The effects have yet to be
seen.
TO SUMMARIZE
In closing, what do we see by the middle of the twenty-ﬁrst century?
First, we will be substantially larger. The world’s population will be
much greater in 2050 than it is today. Indeed, I stand ready to take the
wager of anyone who says that we will be smaller by 2050. So far, I have
not had any takers on that kind of wager. We will be larger by at least 2
or 3 billion people. Second, we will be signiﬁcantly older; there is no
question about that. How much older will vary by country, but in some
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question, more of the world’s population will be concentrated in the
developing world. About 80 percent of the world’s population is in
developing countries now, and we should reach 90 percent by 2050.
Fourth, there is also no question that we will be more urban by 2050. Fifth
and ﬁnally, by mid century, we are going to see greater ethnic and
cultural diversity within countries than we see today. Certainly, migra-
tion will contribute to this diversity and will raise many questions for us
to discuss with regard to ethnic differences, issues of equity, and so on.
Given this likely future, what should be done? Well, there are some
who say the numbers are not correct. They say that the future is
uncertain. Your projections have been wrong in the past, they say, and
they can be wrong in the future. The evidence is mixed or unclear, they
say. The results are inconclusive and, therefore, we should ignore them.
Postpone action, they say—let’s have another research study, let’s get a
committee, let’s get a national task force, let’s get a balanced view of this.
The result is delay. When the eventual date comes for action, a decision
is often made to do nothing. Do nothing because everything is going
along ﬁne, they say. People can take care of themselves. We want them to
be responsible. Don’t interfere with the market. The market can do very
well.
Well, what do I recommend should be done? I recommend a very
different course of action. I recommend that we embrace the expected
future challenges. First, we should acknowledge that for hundreds of
millions of people or perhaps even billions, their markets are failing
them, their governments are failing them, and the international commu-
nity is failing them. These people are in urgent need of help today simply
for their basic needs of food, shelter, and clothing. A second challenge
confronts many developed countries. Population decline and aging will
have far-reaching consequences in some developed countries, forcing
governments to reconsider many existing economic, social, and political
policies, including those relating to migration. These issues will be
especially relevant for women, who outlive men and are usually the
principal caregivers for elderly parents and grandparents.
In order to embrace these challenges, I see at least three important
ingredients. First, bold vision is called for. We must anticipate. We must
look for the critical trends and focus beyond the immediate to the
medium and long term. People in the past who have demonstrated this
longer-term vision include Winston Churchill, Franklin Delano Roose-
velt, Margaret Sanger, Mahatma Gandhi, Dag Hammerskjo ¨ld, Martin
Luther King, and most recently, Nelson Mandela. Second, in addition to
vision, we need strong and enlightened leadership, often in short supply.
Strong leadership, combined with bold vision, can perhaps address some
of these seismic changes that we are undergoing. Finally, we need
resources: ﬁnancial resources of all sorts, sound and healthy environmen-
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internationally recognized human rights. All three types of resources are
essential to implement needed action.
Rather than simply being passengers on a train, not knowing where
the train is headed, I recommend that together we set the course of the
train toward a new agenda. We must determine where we are supposed
to be headed, rather than simply sitting and waiting for the train to move
along. In my vision of this new agenda, the twenty-ﬁrst century should be
and can be a much better place, not only for a fortunate few like those of
us in this room but for all the citizens of the world.
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